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Abstract
Background: The aim of this paper is to illustrate a simple method for increasing the range of
possible options for reducing adverse events in Australian hospitals, which could have been, but
was not, adopted in the wake of the landmark 1995 'Quality in Australian Health Care' study, and
to report the suggestions and the estimated lapse time before they would impact upon mortality
and morbidity.
Method: The study used a modified Delphi technique that first elicited options for reducing
adverse events from an invited panel selected on the basis of their knowledge of the area of adverse
events and quality assurance. Initial suggestions were collated and returned to them for re-
consideration and comment.
Results:  Completed responses from both stages were obtained from 20 of those initially
approached. Forty-one options for reducing AEs were identified with an average lapse time of 3.5
years. Hospital regulation had the least delay (2.4 years) and out of hospital information the greatest
(6.4 years).
Conclusion: Following identification of the magnitude of the problem of adverse events in the
'Quality in Australian Health Care' study a more rapid and broad ranging response was possible
than occurred. Apparently viable options for reducing adverse events and associated mortality and
morbidity remain unexploited.
Background
Results from the 1995 'Quality in Australian Health Care'
(QAHC) study suggested that the quality of health care in
Australia is a problem that overshadows all others in the
health sector. In the initial study, reported by Wilson et al.
[1], medical records for more than 14,000 admissions to
28 hospitals in NSW and SA in 1992 were individually
examined to determine whether or not an adverse event
(AE) was associated with the admission (prior to or dur-
ing the episode of hospitalisation). A team of medical
officers then made a judgment concerning the degree of
preventability of the AE.
By extrapolating results the authors estimated that about
470,000 admissions were associated annually with an AE
and that these would have resulted in 18,000 deaths and
50,000 cases of permanent disability. In a subsequent
report, Runciman et al. [2] estimated that 50% of the AEs
in the QAHC study had a high preventability score. Sixty
per cent of deaths could have been avoided. In this latter
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study, incidence and not prevalence scores were reported
as part of the effort to standardise the methodology with
an earlier Harvard Medical Practice Study (HMPS)
reported by Brennen et al. [3]. This reduced the annual
rate of AEs to 10.6% of admissions.
The direct hospital costs of adverse events, both fatal and
non-fatal, were estimated in the QAHC study at A $900
million per annum. This was likely to have been conserv-
ative 'as the costs of such problems arising in mental
health, nursing homes, domiciliary care, day patients, and
general or specialist practice outside such hospitals were
not included' [[4], p. 7]. Moreover, the cost was based on
each hospital day attributed to an adverse event costing
the same as the average of all hospital days, whereas the
evidence from other studies suggests that hospital stays
associated with adverse events cost more than average.
Using data from the study, Rigby et al. estimated that the
cost of treating 12 conditions, representing just 22% of
the adverse event categories, was A $483 million [[4], p.
9].
Subsequent studies have confirmed the existence of a
major problem. For example, using Victorian Department
of Human Services data, representing 90% of the direct
hospital expenditure in Victoria, Ehsani et al. found that
6.88% of routine admissions were associated with a coded
adverse event [5]. The discrepancy in the incidence of the
problem reported in the latter study, and that reported in
the original QAHC study, is undoubtedly attributable in
part to the methodology. In principle, the dedicated Wil-
son et al. (1995) method of screening, and the individual,
multi-speciality examination of each record, should iden-
tify a larger number of AEs than the routine classification
of records by hospital staff. Ehsani et al. also confirmed
the financial consequences of AEs. According to their cal-
culations, separations associated with an AE had an addi-
tional cost of $2 billion nationally per annum, or an
additional 18.6% of the total inpatient hospital budget. If
50% of these were preventable (the figure used by Runci-
man et al. based on the QAHC data) this would represent
$1 billion nationally.
Following the QAHC study a taskforce under the direction
of Bruce Armstrong was established to look into the prob-
lem. Its report was shelved after a challenge to the validity
of the QAHC study. This resulted in a study by Runciman
et al. [2], the creation of an expert 'group' of four and,
eventually, the Australian Council for Safety and Quality
in Health Care (ACSQHC) in 2000 [6]. This in turn has
been replaced by the Australian Commission on Safety
and Quality in Health Care. The activities of ACSQHC are
summarised in a number of annual reports. In addition,
the Australian Health Care agreement between the Com-
monwealth and State governments allocated budgets of
$680 million and $785 million for quality assurance
activities for the periods 1998–2003 and 2003–2008. In
each of the States, sub-committees and working groups
were created which, along with the ACSQHC, have
resulted in a large number of reports, publications, some
legislation and local initiatives. State activities are summa-
rised in the ACSQHC's Safety Innovations in Practice (SIIP)
Program Mark II, Compendium of Project Reports [7]. In
2004 the Clinical Excellence Commission (CEC) was
launched, as part of the New South Wales Patient Safety
and Clinical Quality Program. It's mission is 'to build con-
fidence in healthcare in NSW, by making it demonstrably
better and safer for patients and a more rewarding work-
place' [8].
Despite this level of activity, the response to what might
justifiably be described as a crisis in Australian hospitals
has been cautious and incremental. Presumably the
results of the QAHC study were known for some time
before publication as the admissions data used in the
study was from 1992. It is scarcely surprising that in 1999
an editorial in the Medical Journal of Australia commented
that, although the various initiatives are welcome, 'the
pace of change nevertheless seems slow given the stark
message of the original QAHC study four years ago....
50,000 Australians suffer permanent disability and
18,000 die at least in part as a result of their health care'
[9]. By 2002 Siddons could still comment that, 'On the
10th anniversary of the study year, the most striking out-
come has been the paucity of reform currently exhibited at
the coalface of tertiary health care' [[10], p. 823] and by
2005 an MJA editorial could still question whether or not
any improvement had been achieved in the previous 10
years [11].
While the exact dimensions of the problem were debated
there was no suggestion at any stage that Australia did not
face a very serious problem. One of the themes of the
present paper is that the response to this could have, and
should have, been significantly faster and more effective.
Some of the problems responsible for AEs addressed
below were self-evident, and immediate administrative
and possibly legislative action might have been justified,
albeit with close monitoring and review following confir-
mation of the causal factors: with preventable deaths
reportedly occurring at a rate equivalent to a Bali bombing
every 3 days, haste was justified but did not occur.
One simple methodology demonstrating how this might
have been achieved is described below. We report the
results of a survey conducted among professionals
diversely associated with the health industry that sought
to canvass practical measures for addressing the problem
of adverse events in hospitals. The purpose was not to cre-
ate a comprehensive check-list of possible interventionsAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2008, 5:25 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/5/1/25
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but, rather, to demonstrate the feasibility of the approach,
and act as a conduit for channelling options to policy
makers and legislators. Some of these have subsequently
been adopted into policy but we have made no attempt to
screen these out as they indicate advice that was immedi-
ately available but often not acted upon. Other potentially
important measures have still not been adopted. A second
reason for the study is the belief that the identification of
even modest new options, or the circulation of proposals
currently under discussion, along with expert opinion
about their feasibility, may be of value due to the size of
the problem being addressed and the magnitude of bene-
fits from even incremental improvements. The approach
does not purport to be a definitive or an authoritative
solution to the problem of AEs. It is more akin to a 'brain-
storming' which seeks to throw up divergent ideas, some
more feasible than others, to enlarge the scope of ideas for
consideration.
Method
We consulted a number of Australian experts in health
safety and quality issues. Their names were obtained from
public domain resources: authors of published articles on
safety and quality issues, departmental officials in the area
of safety, those on relevant committees, conference partic-
ipants, and AE researchers known to the investigators. Of
the 76 individuals who were sent invitations, 23 held
positions in quality control or practice improvement (19
of these were Managers, Directors, Chairmen or Co-ordi-
nators). The next largest group comprised 16 experts in
clinical governance/management or clinical risk manage-
ment (13 of these were Managers, Heads, Co-ordinators
or (Acting/Deputy) Directors). There was some overlap
between these two groups, e.g. when clinicians were Man-
agers of quality control units.) Invitations were also sent
to representatives of government departments (10), to
senior nurses (5) and academics (5). The rest were made
up of epidemiologists, business people, and 9 individuals
for whom we had an affiliation (e.g. hospital or univer-
sity) but no position description. Invitees were asked to
make their suggestions anonymously.
The study adopted a modified Delphi methodology using
a two-stage procedure. First, we sent a questionnaire
describing a number of proposals for improving safety
and quality and asked recipients to comment on the
options and to make additional suggestions. The ques-
tionnaire was divided into 7 sections. These were: (1)
error learning, (2) hospital accreditation, (3) hospital
information systems, (4) out of hospital information, (5)
other hospital regulation, (6) doctors, and (7) system
level reform. New proposals from the first round were
added to the original list and returned to the experts for
comment on their feasibility and potential impact. Specif-
ically, they were asked in the second stage to rate on a six-
point scale: (i) the potential effect of each proposal (very
high, high, low, very low, none, negative), (ii) how
quickly they believe it could be implemented (immediate,
one month, six months, one year, five years, ten years (or
more)), and (iii) the time before the option would be
likely to have a major impact (immediate, one month, six
months, one year, five years, ten years (or more)). They
were also asked to write comments on the proposals,
including arguments for and against their adoption.
Terminology in this area is not uniform. In articulating
the proposals we adopted the preferred terms and defini-
tions used by the ACSQHC [12]. In particular, the follow-
ing definitions were given along with the proposals.
'Adverse Event': An incident in which harm resulted to a
person receiving health care. 'Incident': An event or cir-
cumstance which could have, or did lead to unintended
and/or unnecessary harm to a person, and/or complaint,
loss or damage. 'Harm': Death, disease, injury, suffering,
and/or disability experienced by a person. 'Health Care':
Services provided to individuals or communities to pro-
mote, maintain, monitor, or restore health. Health care is
not limited to medical care and includes self-care.
The analysis was essentially qualitative, not quantitative,
and hypothesis testing of the results is therefore not
appropriate. The objective was to demonstrate the meth-
odology, elicit potentially good ideas, and determine their
feasibility according to the prevailing views of a group of
experts. A single idea from a single person might be more
fruitful than the shared beliefs of a majority. For this rea-
son also, survey response rates, detailed respondent char-
acteristics and representativeness of respondents are of
little interest for the main purposes of the study.
Results
Of the 76 individuals to whom invitations were sent,
completed results from both stages of the survey were
obtained from 20. For the reasons noted above and dis-
cussed later this relatively low response rate does not
invalidate the results or subtract from the potential value
of the suggestions made.
(1) Error Learning and Mandatory Disclosure
The first section dealt with error learning and mandatory
disclosure. The proposals in this section were rated close
to 'high' in terms of their potential effect. The highest
score reported in Table 1 was associated with the collec-
tion and reporting of information on preventable post-
discharge complications after elective surgery (P 1.9).
There was also support for the mandatory reporting of
adverse events (P 1.2), for the mandating of procedures
that would facilitate and encourage the reporting of inci-
dents by patients, (P 1.4), and for mandatory incident
reporting and mandatory review of systems following anAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2008, 5:25 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/5/1/25
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unexpected increase in the frequency of incidents (P 1.5).
The degree of support among experts for mandatory meas-
ures has not been systematically investigated, but the
results reported here suggest that it may be strong. Those
consulted thought it would take less than a year to imple-
ment the proposals dealing with compulsory disclosure
and less than another year before they would have a major
effect.
Table 1: Error learning and mandatory disclosure
Proposals Effecta [1 = v.high 6 = negative] 
Mean (std dev)
Implementb (months) Impactc (months) Totald (years)
1.1 Providers, including doctors and hospitals, 
should receive immunity against litigation 
relating to adverse events that have been 
reported, and compensation to an injured party 
or parties should be paid for from a subsidised 
government or privately run claims-fund where 
compensation is not contingent upon blame.
2.17 (.79) 42 55 8.38
1.2 Reporting of adverse events should be 
mandatory.
2.29 (1.45) 9 9 1.5
1.3 Remedial or punitive action against service 
providers should be independent of 
compensation paid, and all providers should be 
affiliated with an accredited body which 
reviews, collates and provides summary 
information about adverse events to providers.
2.35 (1.00) 26 26 4.3
1.4 Procedures should be mandated that 
facilitate and encourage the reporting of 
incidents by patients.
2.19 (1.11) 9 8 1.4
1.5 There should be mandatory incident 
reporting not just mandatory disclosure of 
adverse events, and mandatory review of 
systems following an unexpected increase in 
the frequency of incidents, in all public and 
private hospitals.e
2.18 (1.29) 11 9 1.7
1.6 There should be complete reporting of all 
patient outcomes, not only incident reporting.
2.41 (1.66) 64 28 7.7
1.7 All hospital deaths should be reviewed by 
an independent clinical governance department 
and deaths suspected of being related to an 
adverse event, plus any action take to prevent 
such events in the future, should be reported.f
2.31 (1.08) 10 18 2.3
1.8 All implanted devices, such as pace makers, 
should have a unique identifier. Whenever a 
clinician or patient reports a problem, or when 
a device is removed, or a patient dies with a 
device in place, this should be recorded on an 
electronic data base. This data base should be 
continually monitored for patterns that might 
indicate a problem.g
2.33 (.97) 10 21 2.6
1.9 Hospitals should collect and report data on 
preventable post-discharge complications after 
elective surgery.
1.93 (.59) 11 21 2.7
a Respondents were asked to rate the potential effect of the option on a six-point scale: 1 = very high, 2 = high, 3 = low, 4 = very low, 5 = none, 6 
= negative. Lower scores indicate a higher potential effect.
b How quickly it could be implemented. First the mean was calculated using the following scale: 1 = immediate, 2 = one month, 3 = six months, 4 = 
one year, 5 = five years, 6 = ten years (or more). Then the result was converted into months. For example, a mean score of 4.63 = 1 yr + 63% of 
48 months (5 yrs – 1 yr) = 42 months (1 yr + 30.24 months).
c Time before the option would be likely to have a major effect: 1 = immediate, 2 = one month, 3 = six months, 4 = one year, 5 = five years, 6 = ten 
years (or more). See above for method of converting into months.
d Implementation time plus impact time.
e In Victoria mechanisms are currently in place to ensure that Root Cause Analysis (RCA) is conducted following an increase in the frequency of 
incidents in public hospitals.
f The Quality and Safety Branch of the Victorian Department of Human Services and the State Coroner's Office already carry out these functions in 
Victoria with full investigation and recommendations are promulgated.
g To some extent this already occurs – e.g. in the case of heart valves [31] and joint replacements [32].Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2008, 5:25 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/5/1/25
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(2) Hospital Accreditation and Audit
Responses to proposals concerning the hospital accredita-
tion and auditing process are summarized in Table 2.
Undertaking regular anonymous surveys of medical and
nursing staff for feedback on the safety and quality climate
in the hospital was rated high in terms of its potential
effect, to be capable of implementation within six
months, and was thought likely to have a major impact
within a year. Confirming the support for mandatory pro-
cedures evident in the last section, there was support for
compulsory accreditation (P 2.1) and for the mandatory
auditing of identified high-risk hospitals (P 2.6).
(3) Hospital Information Systems
The third section, summarized in Table 3, contained four
proposals dealing with in-hospital information systems.
The idea of tailoring clinical pathways to individual
patients (P 3.2) received less support in terms of its poten-
tial effect than the other proposals, and was judged to
require a longer period before a major effect would be felt,
possibly because the requirement that pathways be based
on 'full information regarding patient history and co-mor-
bidities' was thought to impose an excessive burden on
clinical staff. In general, however, the four proposals deal-
ing with in-hospital information systems were rated high
in terms of their potential effect, albeit with varying
implementation and impact times.
(4) Out of Hospital Information
Among other things, Table 4 reveals the potential effect of
a non-compulsory 'smart card' (P 4.1). This card would
allow aspects of a patient's medical history to be accessed
by health care providers at the patient's discretion. Volun-
tary ownership of such a card, and control over the
amount and type of information disclosed, eliminates
some of the privacy concerns associated with such meas-
ures, and the proposal received a 'high' rating from our
respondents in terms of its potential effect. Like the other
Table 2: Hospital accreditation and audit
Proposals Effect [1 = v.high 6 = negative] 
mean (std dev)
Implement (months) Impact (months) Total (years)
2.1 Accreditation should be compulsory for all 
public and private hospitals and day surgery 
facilities.
2.16 (.83) 9 26 2.9
2.2 There should be a review of the criteria for 
achieving accreditation. Criteria should be 
expanded to include more stringent procedures 
relating to safety.a
2.17 (.99) 18 30 4.0
2.3 Accreditation should be more focused on 
measurable outcomes which should be 
standardised to allow benchmarking against other 
hospitals.
2.65 (1.06) 12 41 4.4
2.4 Hospitals should undertake regular 
anonymous surveys of medical and nursing staff to 
get feedback on the safety and quality climate in 
the hospital.b
2.22 (.94) 6 11 1.4
2.5 There should be no forewarning of the date 
on which the accreditation review occurs. 
Accreditation should include follow-up reviews 
on random dates. All hospitals should be subject 
to random audit of facilities and procedures.
2.89 (1.66) 9 12 1.8
2.6 The audit procedures used in the Quality in 
Australian Health Care Studyc should be 
introduced as a permanent feature of the public 
and private hospital systems, with mandatory 
auditing of identified high-risk hospitals, and 
random auditing of the remainder.
2.33 (.97) 12 24 3.0
2.7 The criteria for accreditation should be 
subject to evaluation against known standards for 
the achievement of safety and quality. Where 
possible, the results of random control trials 
should be the basis for the inclusion or rejection 
of criteria and standards.
2.33 (.84) 26 42 4.8
a The Australian Health Ministers have recently endorsed the release of a Discussion Paper on National Safety and Quality Accreditation Standards 
as the basis for consultation with stakeholders [33].
b We note that some hospitals already do this – e.g. the Royal Children's Hospital in Victoria.
c Wilson, R. M., W. B. Runciman, R. W. Gibberd, B. T. Harrison, L. Newby and J. D. Hamilton (1995). 'The Quality in Australian Health Care Study.' 
Medical Journal of Australia 163(9): 458–471.Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2008, 5:25 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/5/1/25
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proposals in this section, our panel believed it would take
several years to implement, but, unlike the other propos-
als, it would have a major impact in less than a year once
implemented. By contrast, the positive effect of making
information on comparative risk adjusted mortality and
adverse event rates available to the public (P 4.2) or Pri-
vate Health Insurance Funds (P 4.3) received the lowest
effect ratings in the survey – both 'Low'. This may reflect
the tendency to deal with safety and quality problems 'in-
house' rather than expose doctors and hospitals to criti-
cism from without. Alternatively – and as suggested by
more than one of our respondents – such information
might be difficult for private insurance organizations to
interpret and measure.
(5) Other Hospital Regulation
Section five dealt with other hospital regulation. (See
Table 5.) In terms of its potential effect, the proposal that
new or extant procedures should be formalised to guaran-
tee anonymity and/or protection for whistle blowers (P
5.2) was rated third among all proposals, casting doubt
on the suggestion above that respondents believe safety
and quality issues problems should be dealt with 'in-
house'. Also receiving strong support was the idea that
hospital staff should assume 'ownership' of safety and
quality issues (P 5.4), and that this can be encouraged by
training staff in risk management.
(6) Doctors
Responses to the suggestions directly effecting doctors are
reported in Table 6. Three of the proposals in this section
were rated in the top five overall in terms of their potential
effect. The proposal that the supervision and support of
junior doctors should be improved (P 6.4) was rated high-
est overall. This was also judged to be quickly imple-
mentable – within nine months – and would be likely to
have a major impact upon AEs within another seven
months. Also rated high was the potential effect of creden-
tialing medical students who become interns before con-
ducting unsupervised procedures (e.g. inserting
nasogastric tubes). There was also support for centres of
excellence that are dedicated to certain procedures – e.g.
colon cancer surgery – when it is known that the outcome
of such procedures is influenced by the quality of the prac-
tice setting or the case load of the unit or doctor (P 6.2).
The establishment of such centres would of course be a
long-term goal, thus explaining the longer estimated
implementation and impact times.
(7) System Level Reform
The final section of the survey dealt with system level
reforms. (See Table 7.) Not surprisingly, it was thought
these options, in general, would take longer to imple-
ment, and that their effect would take longer to be felt.
Among proposals aimed at system level reform, the idea
that higher payments should be made for practices that
are known to improve safety – e.g. the use of approved
protocols (P 7.1) – rated highest in terms of potential
effect. This idea has been adopted in the UK, where GPs
have obtained a significant pay rise for complying with
safety and quality indicators.
Table 3: Hospital information systems
Proposals Effect [1 = v.high 6 = negative] 
mean (std dev)
Implement (months) Impact (months) Total (years)
3.1 As a condition of accreditation all hospitals 
meeting designated criteria with respect to 
patient numbers and case complexity should 
have an appropriate internal information system 
for recording patient history, treatment 
(including drugs), digitized radiological imaging, 
pre- and post-discharge requirements.
2.11 (.68) 33 26 4.9
3.2 Clinical pathways should be tailored to 
individual patients and based on full information 
regarding patient history and co-morbidities, and 
not be geared to the average patient.a
2.71 (1.10) 30 35 5.4
3.3 All medical handovers should be 
documented in writing to minimise errors due to 
lack of continuity of care.
2.39 (1.14) 8 10 1.5
3.4 All hospitals should have systems in place to 
identify patients who become acutely ill and to 
summon appropriate expertise to the bedside 
within minutes.
2.00 (.89) 8 12 1.7
a The Victorian Department of Human Services has pointed out that 'clinical pathways', by their nature, are geared to the average patient, which 
ensures that core sets of tools are utilised. However, they agree that 'the clinical pathway should allow for variances based on clinical judgement 
and patients within a known Diagnosis Related Group (DRG)'.Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2008, 5:25 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/5/1/25
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Table 4: Out of hospital information
Proposals Effect [1 = v.high 6 = negative] 
mean (std dev)
Implement (months) Impact (months) Total (years)
4.1 All Australians registered with Medicare 
should be offered the option of a smart card 
which contains the patient's full medical history, 
and/or the option of having their medical 
history kept on a centralized database. As an 
option, the card or database should have a 
'secure' record of personal information which 
the patient wishes to keep confidential under 
normal conditions and which can be transferred 
from the patient to the doctor using a 
confidential PIN. All health care providers 
should have (subsidized) facilities for accessing 
information which is not confidential.
2.00 (.71) 47 9 4.7
4.2 Comparative risk adjusted mortality and 
adverse event rates should be on the provider 
website and freely available to the public. 
Providers should be allowed to comment on 
these data when the comment is informational 
and not marketing for the practice. The date by 
which this information must be posted should 
be determined by the volume of procedures 
and the elapsed time until the numbers allow 
the information to be statistically reliable. In the 
interim, process information should be 
provided.
3.06 (1.14) 43 52 7.9
4.3 The government should provide summary 
hospital data to Private Health Insurance Funds. 
Funds should be encouraged to use this data 
when contracting with hospitals.
3.27 (1.10) 33 50 6.9
4.4 Each State and Territory Health 
Department should routinely link discharge and 
re-admission data to determine the likelihood 
of an incident-related re-admission within a 
defined period. This provision should, 
subsequently, be extended to include data from 
the Health Insurance Commission and 
individual-level mortality statistics. Criteria 
should be developed to identify hospitals, 
hospital teams, and individual practitioners with 
an atypically high level of adverse events, to 
report on between-hospital variation, and to 
identify areas for improvement.a
2.78 (1.17) 40 30 5.8
4.5 As in parts of the United States and the 
United Kingdom, information should be 
available to the public, including on the internet, 
regarding risk-adjusted mortality and adverse 
event by cause for all public and private 
hospitals. Data should only be posted where 
the number of cases is sufficiently large that a 
statistically significant pattern could be 
expected to emerge. When case loads are 
below this threshold, this fact and other 
process information should be made available. 
Independent groups (such as consumer 
organisations) should be funded to interpret 
and disseminate this information. (This later 
step is needed or, as in some US states, there 
will be minimal impact of information.)
2.94 (1.14) 35 43 6.5
a It should be noted that re-admission is not always related to an adverse event, and therefore is not a reliable indicator on its own.Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2008, 5:25 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/5/1/25
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Discussion
The purpose of this survey was twofold. First, it sought to
demonstrate that a method was available – and remains
available – for identifying reform options that may be
fairly rapidly implemented if subsequent inquiry endorses
their feasibility. Implicit in this suggestion is the view that
it is not necessary or appropriate when people are dying in
large numbers to follow exhaustive, time-consuming
processes employing existing and conventional channels
and designated authorities. Secondly, it sought to demon-
strate this by identifying options that might have been –
and in most cases still may be – considered for reducing
AEs. We discuss these aims in reverse order.
Options and Timelines
In contrast with the view that little can be done quickly, a
number of suggestions were raised in the present study
which, according to our panel, could effect significant and
effective change fairly rapidly. In Table 8, which summa-
rises the results, the average lapse time of the 41 interven-
tions before having a significant impact was 3.5 years. The
19 options expected to have an impact within 3 years had
an average lapse time of 1.8 years before having a signifi-
cant effect. Measures affecting doctors directly and the reg-
ulation of hospitals had a particularly small delay (2.5
years and 2.4 years respectively). At the other extreme, out
of hospital information was felt to have a slow effect.
A distinguishing feature of some of the suggestions is that
they involve regulatory enforcement which appears to be
inconsistent with the apparent emphasis upon persuasion
and voluntary culture-change evident in many of the ini-
tiatives suggested in official reports. In some cases, man-
dated options gained support in preference to the
approach that 'treats the health provider as if it exists in
isolation from its environment, oblivious to the institu-
tional, social and economic pressures that drive organisa-
tional willingness to contemplate internal reforms' [[13],
p. S56].
Healy and Braithwaite articulate a 'pyramid' of regulatory
mechanisms with 'soft' options at the bottom (personal
monitoring, continuing education...), which progresses
through increasingly more stringent regulatory measures
(peer review, published performance indicators, external
clinical audit...), up to 'command and control' at the top
(criminal or civil penalty, licence revocation or suspen-
sion...). The pyramid consists of 27 'mechanisms', 14 of
which fall within the general categories of 'voluntarism',
'market mechanisms' or 'self-regulation'. It is doubtful
that these mechanism alone will have the desired effect,
but rather that, for example, 'dependence on voluntary
reporting systems will lead to a gross and inconsistent
underestimate of the size of the problem' [[14], p. 261].
Responses to the proposals raised in the present study,
Table 5: Other hospital regulation
Proposals Effect [1 = v.high 6 = negative] 
mean (std dev)
Implement (months) Impact (months) Total (years)
5.1 Regulation should require a defined minimum 
complement of qualified staff in situ (or in close 
proximity) following defined procedures in all 
public and private hospitals, where the required 
minimum is determined by patient safety during 
the high-risk period of recuperation.
2.00 (.79) 12 9 1.8
5.2 All hospitals should have in place a risk 
management system that ensures personnel can 
initiate action to prevent and/or reduce the impact 
of risks. Whistle-blower procedures should be 
formalised to guarantee anonymity and/or 
protection for whistle blowers.
1.82 (.73) 8 10 1.5
5.3 All hospitals should have trained, specialized 
risk management staff.
2.24 (.75) 9 11 1.7
5.4 All hospital staff should be trained in risk 
management, so that all staff assume 'ownership' of 
safety and quality issues.a
2.00 (.94) 12 11 1.9
5.5 All hospitals should have in place an equipment 
replacement program and dedicated funding 
should be made available annually to replace 
unsafe equipment. This funding should not be part 
of the overall budget.
2.19 (.91) 11 31 3.5
5.6 All university hospitals should have medical 
education departments for (a) education, (b) 
credentialing and (c) simulation.
1.94 (.57) 31 19 4.2
a There is some scope for disagreement about what this might mean in practice. For example, the Victorian Department of Human Services 
believes 'that all staff should be aware of RCA processes (Root Cause Analysis) but need not be fully trained in conducting a RCA'.Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2008, 5:25 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/5/1/25
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particularly those relating to mandatory measures, suggest
that the employment of more demanding strategies fur-
ther up the pyramid might be warranted. As Healy and
Braithwaite emphasize, the ideal is not to replace persua-
sion with punishment, but to move up the pyramid when,
and for as long as, mechanisms lower down fail to be
effective. Many of the suggestions made by our expert
panel indicate how this might be done.
(1) Error Learning and Mandatory Disclosure
At the time of the QAHC study, it was not compulsory for
hospitals and doctors to register AEs and routinely pro-
vide feedback to facilitate error learning. This means that
the most important vehicle for improving quality and
reducing patient risk was not compulsory. While open dis-
closure is mostly implemented in public hospitals now,
the opportunity for error leaning is almost certainly
under-utilised in some hospitals. Legislation might ensure
the universality of this critical reform, given sufficient data
processing mechanisms to enable policing. In Denmark
mandatory reporting and comprehensive protection for
reporting doctors has resulted in a high reporting rate with
50% of reports coming from doctors. This is no higher
than 10% at the best sites in Australia and as low as 1% in
some. The adverse events register in Australia could be
linked to individual doctors and medical teams where
appropriate, and suitable threshold levels installed that
sequentially trigger information feedback for the purposes
of review, followed by more active intervention. Despite
this, nine years after publication of the QAHC study the
chairman of the ACSQHC noted that 'we have insufficient
accurate data for fully appreciating the current size of the
multiple causes of this problem ... we need the data from
multiple sources, including incident monitoring systems,
routine administration data sources and the use of screen-
ing tools to practically identify areas that may cause harm'
[[15], p. 5]. The mandatory reporting of AEs rated high
among our experts in terms of its potential effect.
The published research on 'high reliability organizations'
suggests that it is wise to separate information-gathering
and inquisitorial processes from punishment such as dis-
accreditation. Adverse events are unlikely to be reported if
there is a financial incentive to hide the AE. For this reason
legislative protection of doctors from the financial out-
come of litigation is a reasonable prerequisite for a com-
Table 6: Doctors
Proposals Effect [1 = v.high 6 = negative] 
mean (std dev)
Implement (months) Impact (months) Total (years)
6.1 Criteria should be mandated to determine a 
doctor's right to perform some procedures. 
These should require periodic review of death 
rates and adverse events (inter alia). When 
adverse events and mortality are associated with 
an attribute of a practice that is known to 
increase risk (such as small numbers of patients, 
service delivery to inappropriate patients, or 
where clinical indicators suggest the procedure is 
unwarranted) review might be followed initially by 
advice to alter the unsafe practice or procedure 
and subsequently, if appropriate, by 
disaccreditation for that procedure.
2.00 (.73) 22 22 3.7
6.2 Centres of excellence should be established 
that are dedicated to certain procedures – e.g. 
colon cancer surgery – when it is known that the 
outcome of such procedures is influenced by the 
quality of the practice setting or the case load of 
the unit or doctor.
1.81 (.75) 45 18 5.3
6.3 All medical students who become interns 
should be 'credentialed' before they are allowed 
to do any unsupervised procedures (e.g. inserting 
nasogastric tubes).
1.94 (.77) 9 9 1.5
6.4 The supervision and support of junior doctors 
should be improved.
1.56 (.63) 9 7 1.3
6.5 All new graduates and all new entrants into 
the system (e.g. foreign graduates) should have 
regular performance reviews by medical 
educators – say, every three months.
2.20 (.68) 9 11 1.7
6.6 All hospital doctors should provide e-mail 
addresses so that hospitals can communicate new 
protocols, safety rules, etc.
2.33 (.82) 7 10 1.4Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2008, 5:25 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/5/1/25
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prehensive, on-going process of error learning. The
consequences for a doctor associated with an AE should
be based upon medical criteria and uncoupled from the
social mechanism for compensating patients, except
where damage occurs due to negligence. In brief, 'the chal-
lenge for health care is to shift from a blame culture to a
learning culture, in order to learn from adverse events'
[[13], S57], as has occurred, for instance, in the aviation
industry [16]. This was the view of our respondents, who
gave a high effect rating to the proposal that doctors and
hospitals should receive immunity against litigation relat-
ing to adverse events, and compensation to an injured
party or parties should be paid for from a subsidised gov-
ernment or privately run claims-fund where compensa-
Table 7: System level reform
Proposals Effect [1 = v.high 6 = negative] 
mean (std dev)
Implement (months) Impact (months) Total (years)
7.1 Higher payments should be made throughout 
the public and private system for practices that are 
known to improve safety. Private insurance 
companies should be mandated to comply with 
this regulation. Practices known to improve safety 
might include (a) the use of approved protocols, 
(b) the performance of procedures in a hospital or 
facility specifically accredited for the procedure, 
(c) conduct of the procedure by a specifically 
accredited provider (several accreditation 
categories may be desirable).
2.13 (.92) 24 31 4.6
7.2 There should be independent analysis at the 
national level, as well as individual hospital analysis, 
of adverse events, to assist in the identification of 
rare but catastrophic events.
2.50 (.86) 11 27 3.2
7.3 A National Benchmarking Centre for Clinical 
and Public Health Outcomes should be established 
to provide hospitals and clinical managers with 
ready access to standardised outcomes measures 
for all treatments, particularly major adverse-
event causing treatments.
2.41 (.80) 35 32 5.6
7.4 A National Centre for The Development of 
Clinical Guidelines and Clinical Pathways should be 
established to (a) promote evidence-based 
practice, (b) fund, support and disseminate 
evidence-based clinical guidelines, and (c) prepare 
model clinical pathways to assist hospitals plan and 
organise care.
2.27 (.88) 26 31 4.8
Table 8: Summary of lapse time before significant effect
Category Proposals (N) Average lapse 
time (years)
Category Proposals (N) Average lapse 
time (years)
Impact < 3 
years
Total in this 
category
Impact < 3 
years
Total in this 
category
1. Error 
Learning and 
Mandatory 
Disclosure
69 3 . 6 5 .  O t h e r  
Hospital 
Regulations
46 2 . 4
2. Hospital 
Accreditation 
and Audit
3 7 3.2 6. Doctors 4 6 2.5
3. Hospital 
Information 
Systems
2 4 3.4 7. System Level 
Reform
04 3 . 6
4. Out of 
Hospital 
Information
05 6 . 4 T o t a l 04 3 . 5Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2008, 5:25 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/5/1/25
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tion is not contingent upon blame. In the context of
quality assurance activities the States and Territories have
all now implemented measures to provide this protection.
(2) Hospital Accreditation and Audit
For decades health professionals have believed that a sig-
nificant number of small hospitals are dangerous. How-
ever, with full knowledge of the QAHC results, hospital
accreditation remains voluntary in all States except Victo-
ria. Although most public and private hospitals undergo
formal accreditation procedures, the danger of self-selec-
tion remains. Low quality hospitals will not opt for
accreditation and poorly qualified doctors will seek out
these hospitals. Multiple accreditation teams could have
the power to randomly inspect all hospitals or units
within hospitals and (in the most extreme cases) close
those judged to be dangerous – as occurs with restaurants
with sub-standard hygiene. The proposal that universal
accreditation should be mandated was rated 'high' by our
experts in terms of its potential effect (P2.1).
In a written response to our survey, the Victorian Depart-
ment of Human Services expressed the view that formal
accreditation should occur on pre-arranged dates 'as this
provides value in allowing hospitals to independently
check, maintain, improve their systems prior to accredita-
tion'. Another respondent thought the proposal unfeasi-
ble because 'hospitals take up to 12 months to self-
evaluate'. Of course, non-random accreditation also
allows hospitals 'to independently check, maintain,
improve their systems prior to accreditation'. But the
problem with accreditation on pre-arranged dates is that
it may give an atypical picture of a hospital during the
much longer non-review period. The time-consuming
nature of the review process should not be underesti-
mated but neither should the human cost of sub-standard
hospitals. The Victorian DHS agrees that 'follow-up review
and spot checks should be carried out on random dates'.
It is unclear whether or not present accreditation is suffi-
ciently rigorous to reduce preventable adverse events sig-
nificantly. There appears little reason why the
accreditation process should not itself be reviewed to
ensure that credentialed hospitals satisfy rigorous safety
standards in their facilities and procedures. The proposal
that there should be a review of the criteria for achieving
accreditation, and that the criteria should be expanded to
include more stringent procedures relating to safety (P
2.2), received a high impact rating from our experts.
To date, the majority of the reforms contemplated in gov-
ernment-commissioned reports represent process meas-
ures of success. However, their objective is to reduce
adverse events and for this reason medical record analysis
of the form conducted by the QAHC study should argua-
bly be an on-going feature of the system. The QAHC study
was relatively expensive, but these costs are small com-
pared to the importance of the surveillance, the costs, the
morbidity and the deaths averted. The proposal that the
audit procedures used in the QAHC study should be intro-
duced as a permanent feature of the public and private
hospital systems, with mandatory auditing of identified
high-risk hospitals, and random auditing of the remain-
der, was also judged favourably by our panel.
In 2005 the new Australian Commission on Safety and
Quality in Health Care commissioned an advisory group
to examine what data might be used to create a national
dataset. The advisory group considered whether the
QAHC study might be repeated, but concluded 'that the
major difficulty of achieving consistent and reproducible
definitions of 'adverse event' and 'preventable adverse
event' would seriously hinder accurate comparisons of
any new study with those of the past' [[17], p. S40]. How-
ever, it seems seriously misguided to allow such semantic
obstacles to stand in the way of an important study which
could produce independently important data. Any new
study must be explicit about the definitions used, so that
it is clear where comparisons are valid, where they are not,
and where they are doubtful. But as Wilson and Van Der
Weyden note, 'the absence of recent system-wide data on
patient safety seriously hinders our ability to manage the
problem and make improvements. Its absence makes a
mockery of the tenets of continuous quality improve-
ment' [[11], p. 260].
This is not to deny that there may be cheaper ways of gain-
ing the same information than repeating the ACSQHC.
For example, valuable information on adverse event rates
can be obtained from routinely collected admissions data
[5,18,19], although this method has its inherent limita-
tions – e.g. adverse events that only manifest after dis-
charge are likely to be missed.
(3) Hospital Information Systems
Patient notes are still transferred within hospitals using
19th Century clipboards. It is known that this commonly
causes potentially lethal errors. The mandated use of
(long available) electronic forms of transmission could
alert staff to the risk of inappropriate procedures, the
administration of conflicting drugs or the failure to
administer a drug. Likewise X-ray films are sometimes
misplaced or lost. The consequences may again be lethal.
Legislation could mandate the use of digital technology
(with appropriate back-up systems and staff training) to
ensure immediate access to results. New wireless technol-
ogies make it possible for roving staff – doctors and other
professionals – to have constant access to text and basic
technical data. There is no reason why much of the health
system should have missed the IT revolution that hasAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2008, 5:25 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/5/1/25
Page 12 of 15
(page number not for citation purposes)
transformed other parts of the community. In relation to
the size of the AE problem, the cost of implementing 21st
Century information technology throughout the health
system is likely to be small relative to the human and
financial cost of AEs averted. Making it a condition of
accreditation that 'all hospitals ... should have an appro-
priate internal information system for recording patient
history, treatment (including drugs), digitized radiologi-
cal imaging, pre- and post-discharge requirements' (P 3.1)
was rated 'high' by our experts in terms of its potential
effect.
(4) Out of Hospital Information
A persuasive argument can be made that the public has a
right to information relating to the performance of hospi-
tals and individual doctors, provided 'that it is of high
quality and able to be benchmarked in a valid way' [[20],
p. S50]. There can be little doubt that, if consulted, the
public would overwhelmingly endorse the need for this
information. Additionally, the provision of information is
an effective method for effecting change and it is likely
that the pace of reform would be accelerated if the public
was aware of the safety record of various health care pro-
viders. One argument against this is that the provision of
information might result in a loss of confidence in hospi-
tals and doctors. However, this fear seems to be
unfounded [14]. The argument that the public should be
kept in ignorance to engender unjustified confidence is, at
best, dubious, and if this ignorance allows an inadequate
policy response then it is additionally dangerous. In some
states of the USA, and most notably New York, severity
adjusted mortality rates are available for every hospital
and for every doctor. This has not resulted in a significant
change in the pattern for public demand but it has galva-
nised doctors and hospital staff to successfully review and
upgrade their procedures [21]. League tables have recently
been introduced in England to allow doctors and patients
to evaluate the performance of particular hospitals [22].
From late 2004 the performance of individual surgeons
will probably be available [23]. The impact of these meas-
ures can be expected to depend, inter alia, on public edu-
cation.
As noted, our respondents were circumspect on the ques-
tion of public access to the safety record of hospitals and
providers of medical care (P 4.2), and thought it would
take several years before any measures along these lines
would have a major impact. Several of those surveyed
indicated a particularly long timeframe – ten years or
more – one suggesting that data regarding risk-adjusted
mortality and adverse event by cause are slow to identify
problems, both requiring more than 7 years to gain statis-
tical significance. As noted earlier, the rather negative
response to this proposal might, in part, be attributable to
a desire to keep problems and solutions 'in-house' rather
than tarnish professional reputations through publicity.
However, it is hard to reconcile this with the later support
for whistle blowing among our panel, and a more likely
explanation is a belief that the public is ill-equipped to
deal appropriately with the information. For example, as
the Victorian Department of Human Services commented:
'There is not a sufficient level of sophistication or under-
standing of risk-adjusted mortality and adverse event by
cause to make the information available to the public'.
Arguably, however, this indicates the need for simple pres-
entation of data, the provision of explanatory notes and
public education. There is little reason to believe the Aus-
tralian public is less able to appreciate this type of infor-
mation than the UK and the US public. The important
lesson from the latter experience is that publication of this
data has not resulted in a negative response from the pub-
lic but appears to have provided motivation for profes-
sional self-improvement.
More generally, access to data relating to health system
performance, other than the material routinely published
by government, is very difficult to obtain. As an example,
access to Australia-wide, de-identified public hospital
records requires the separate consent of all States and Ter-
ritories as well as the co-operation of the Commonwealth
Department of Health or AIHW (Australian Institute of
Health and Welfare). Data linkage to determine the con-
sequences of different treatment patterns – who lives and
who dies – is so difficult that the research is effectively
proscribed for most researchers.
(5) Other Hospital Regulation
There is no regulation that links on-site expertise and the
complexity or riskiness of the procedures that may be
undertaken in a hospital. For example, it is possible for a
hospital to permit significant surgery but have no on-site
medical practitioner post-operatively. It was not until
2003 that the ACSQHC released a paper considering
issues of staff rostering, skill mix, staff numbers, staff
supervision and team functioning [7]. While endorsing
the AMA (voluntary) code of practice [24], it comments –
almost 8 years after the QAHC study – that 'responsibility
for improving the management of staffing variables can-
not [i.e. should not but still is being] left to individuals. It
is a governance responsibility...' [[25], p. ii]. The proposal
that regulation should require a defined minimum com-
plement of qualified staff in situ (or in close proximity)
following defined procedures in all public and private
hospitals was judged by our experts to have a potentially
high effect upon the reduction of AEs.
The proposal that all hospitals should have in place a risk
management system that ensures personnel can initiate
action to prevent and/or reduce the impact of risks,
backed up by whistle-blower procedures that guaranteeAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2008, 5:25 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/5/1/25
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anonymity and/or protection (P. 5.2), received a 'high'
effectiveness rating from our respondents, and in fact now
exists in many hospitals. In general, the potential role of
staff in adopting 'affirmative action' to reduce AEs was
viewed very positively. This included support for the idea
that all hospital staff should be trained in risk manage-
ment so that staff assume 'ownership' of safety and quality
issues (P 5.4).
(6) Doctors
Patterns of private practice are already subject to scrutiny
in Australia. But the chief purpose is to detect medical
fraud. Legislation could require the examination of prac-
tices to detect those that deviate significantly from evi-
dence-based guidelines constructed by the relevant Royal
Colleges. When there is a known relationship between the
small number of procedures carried out by a doctor and
negative outcomes, as occurs with some types of surgery,
critical annual procedure rates may be established that
trigger the provision of information to the doctor, the
mandatory review of the practice and finally, in the most
extreme cases, the dis-accreditation of the doctor for the
conduct of these procedures, perhaps contingent upon re-
training. While it is true that some doctors take on the
hard cases, partial standardisation for case complexity is
possible, and this would obviously be taken into account
by those conducting a review. Along these lines, a detailed
national standard for credentialing and defining the scope
of clinical practice has been produced by the ACSQHC
[26].
The single proposal judged by our panel to have highest
potential effect concerned the supervision and support of
junior doctors (P 6.4). This was judged to be implementa-
ble within nine months and likely to have a major impact
upon AEs within another seven months. Similarly, the
proposal that all medical students who become interns
should be 'credentialed' before being allowed to under-
take any unsupervised procedures was rated high (P 6.3).
While flawed systems and procedures are clearly impli-
cated in the occurrence of AEs, these latter results suggest
that human error plays an important role in the occur-
rence of AEs.
(7) System Level Reform
Financial incentives are one of the most effective, non-
coercive ways of achieving desired outcomes and numer-
ous economic studies have demonstrated their effective-
ness. In Australia there has been limited use of this
powerful instrument and the financing of medical services
has generally been perceived as a reward for providers
doing what they select to do rather than as an opportunity
for influencing what is done. This is an important missed
opportunity. (As one of our respondents pointed out, ret-
rospective payment for safety-related practices will proba-
bly reward well-endowed hospitals, providing one reason
for using prospective payment.) Financial incentives are
non-coercive and avoid the head-to-head conflict between
'clinical autonomy' and the 'patient's right to evidence-
based medicine' that may accompany direct regulation.
The proposal that higher payments should be made
throughout the public and private system for practices
that are known to improve safety received a high potential
effect rating, but with implementation and impact times
stretching into years rather than months [27-29].
In its Fourth Report, the ACSQHC notes a number of State
initiatives aimed at the reduction of AEs [15]. But there is
no reference to national legislative action to enforce
safety. As Healy and Braithwaite note: 'there are no
national published measures of adverse events, despite
the beginnings of state-based monitoring of sentinel
events. Without some form of standardised reporting,
there is no way to benchmark performance and to system-
atically trace progress' [[13], p. S57]. Indeed, there is some
evidence that the ACSQHC was itself frustrated with the
scale of the national effort. For example, in a recent Medi-
cal Journal of Australia article its Chairman comments: 'one
might assume that systematic improvements within the
health system are either happening or, at the least, well
advanced. Regrettably, improvements are still patchy. The
greatest challenge for all remains how to achieve universal
and systemic changes to the health system within a feder-
ated system' [[20], p. S49].
Among our panel there was support for such leadership –
for example, the establishment of a National Centre for
The Development of Clinical Guidelines and Clinical
Pathways, which would promote evidence-based practice,
disseminate evidence-based clinical guidelines, and pre-
pare model clinical pathways to assist hospitals plan and
organise care.
The Methodology
Our study was, in part, illustrative of what might have, but
did not, happen following publication of the QAHCS.
Ideally this would have involved a much larger-scale
study, and have canvassed suggestions from any individ-
ual or group in a position to make useful suggestions.
The reported research was conducted with a limited
budget and with no 'official endorsement' – e.g. from the
Australian Medical Association. This narrowed the
number and range of those who could be surveyed.
Unsurprisingly, the response rate was low (but typical for
'cold' mail questionnaires). The options for reform sug-
gested were general, not detailed, and the time-lines nom-
inated were subjective. The scope and detail of the
suggestions are necessarily more limited than would have
been outlined with a large, official survey. However, theAustralia and New Zealand Health Policy 2008, 5:25 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/5/1/25
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conclusion that any of these factors invalidates the
research or undermines its credibility would miss the
point of the study.
The study was based on the belief that a single idea from
a single person, irrespective of their authority, may con-
tribute to a reduction in unnecessary deaths. The mini-
mum acceptable sample size is '1' if the suggestions
obtained are valuable. The antithesis of this approach is
the view that action should be delayed until 'due process'
has been followed, consisting of the agreement or consen-
sus of appropriate authorities. The cost of such delay,
however, is loss of life and permanent injury.
Our survey was akin to an organised 'brain storming' exer-
cise with feedback. Suggestions are a starting point, not an
endpoint for policy reform and development. Likewise,
the nominated time-lines are indicative of a view among
some well-informed commentators that action following
the QAHC study could have been significantly swifter.
They do not purport to reflect objective data.
While the low response rate is of limited methodological
relevance it was disappointing. We expected that, given
the gravity of the subject, we might have obtained a higher
rate. Informal feedback suggested one likely reason. The
authors, being social scientists, would be perceived as hav-
ing little authority, credibility or legitimate role in the
field of service delivery and safety; that their research
should have been limited to cost-benefit analysis. This
response may be indicative of a 'closed shop' culture: the
safety of our health services is a matter for accredited med-
ical experts operating from within approved institutions
with approved channels for effecting reform – a sugges-
tion also made by others [[13], p. S56]. If correct, this atti-
tude, in conjunction with inadequate governance of
quality, might go some way towards explaining the slug-
gish response in the field to the QAHC report and, of
course, the large number of unnecessary deaths caused by
this. It suggests the need for a governance that seeks and is
more responsive to a broadening of the input and
approach to such a multi-faceted problem as AEs, and in
which the magnitude of the problem, as documented by
the QAHCS, would warrant government involvement at
the highest level.
The appropriate test of the validity of a method, in this
area, is whether or not it elicits useful suggestions which
have not, to date, been canvassed or carefully examined.
Our incomplete reading of the literature suggests that our
minimalist research effort indeed identified options with
the potential for saving lives – and did so quickly and at
little expense. If correct, this reveals a significant defi-
ciency in the methods used over the past fifteen years for
governance of quality and safety in Australia's hospital
system.
Conclusion
Relative to the size of the problem, the response to the
QAHC study was very surprising, to say the least. The
study authoritatively documented what was arguably the
most dramatic and serious problem ever found in the
health system – and possibly the nation as a whole.
Annual deaths from AEs were initially estimated to be
equivalent to 13 jumbo jet crashes each year, each result-
ing in 350 deaths: events that would surely have galva-
nized rapid and decisive action. The lack of effective
action that followed publication of the QAHC study
revealed a fundamental failure of governance by both the
State and the Commonwealth governments and an appar-
ent lack of willingness to respond appropriately at both
the bureaucratic and political levels.
In terms of the magnitude of death and injury involved,
an analogy with a war casualty rate is not unjustified. In
the face of ongoing casualties, decision makers in war
time must exercise judgement and take responsibility for
a rapid response. With an estimated 50 Australians dying
daily and another 140 sustaining permanent injury, at the
time of the QAHC study, the appropriate criteria for
immediate action should have been 'likely cause' and
'likely solution' not 'confirmed, demonstrated cause' or
'solution based on professional consensus'. This type of
decision making clearly did not occur in Australia follow-
ing the release of the QAHC study.
Historically, safety and quality control of the health sys-
tem has relied on internal rather than external monitor-
ing: 'the state generally has left the regulation of health
care performance to the medical profession' [[13], p. S56].
However, the reliance on voluntary regulation has seen
public confidence in the health system shaken, particu-
larly in the wake of media reports highlighting some very
upsetting healthcare 'scandals' [30]. The result has seen
the emergence of new regulatory bodies, the production
of numerous reports, and the expenditure of millions of
dollars, but the rate of change still appears to be slow. As
the Chairman of the ACSQHC commented: 'the new
Commission [on Safety and Quality in Health Care] must
not only recommend reforms to ministers, but be able to
push jurisdictions to move at a faster pace than in the past'
[[20], p. S49]. The new commission has no ability to affect
jurisdictions despite recommendations that it should
have such powers.
The ACSQHC faced numerous obstacles during its six-year
tenure [20] and worked hard to improve the safety and
quality of health care in Australian hospitals. Its achieve-
ments should not be underestimated. Despite this, sys-Australia and New Zealand Health Policy 2008, 5:25 http://www.anzhealthpolicy.com/content/5/1/25
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tematic change has been slow in coming. In an Editorial
in the Medical Journal of Australia in 2005, a member of the
Council asked, 'Ten years on can we confidently state that
healthcare is safer for patients?' and answered forthrightly,
'There is insufficient information at a state or national
level to determine whether any or all of the efforts over the
past 10 years have increased safety in our hospitals' [11].
The purpose of the present paper was not to publish a
blueprint for reform or to claim that our suggestions are
authoritative but to demonstrate the possibility of a more
rapid and vigorous response to the challenge of AEs and
to raise some practical suggestions, which, we hope, may
still help to improve the safety and quality of health care
in Australia.
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